Abstract: Central to the economic theory behind sticky costs is the proposition that managers take into account adjustment costs when changing resource levels. Few studies have been able to test this theoretical prediction empirically due to the difficulty of measuring adjustment costs directly. Adjustment costs associated with firing employees that arise due to employment protection legislation (EPL) in different countries provides an apt setting to test this prediction because prior research in economics provides strong support for linking EPL with adjustment costs for labor. Using a sample of 15,833 firms in 19 OECD countries during 1990-2008, we test the association between firm-level cost stickiness and country-level EPL measures. We find that the degree of cost stickiness is increasing in the strictness of EPL provisions, consistent with our hypotheses based on adjustment costs, and supporting the theory that sticky cost behavior is driven by managers' deliberate resource commitment decisions in the presence of adjustment costs.
Introduction
Recent studies have documented strong evidence of asymmetric cost behavior. Costs are sticky when the cost response to a decrease in activity is smaller than the cost response to an equivalent increase in activity (Anderson et al., 2003 , Balakrishnan et al., 2004 , Banker et al., 2010b , Weiss 2010 . The prevalence of cost stickiness calls into question the validity of the traditional cost model which implies a mechanical symmetric relationship between changes in activity and changes in costs. Recognizing this potential source of asymmetry in cost behavior and hence in earnings changes has also been shown to be informative in forecasting earnings and understanding earnings management in financial accounting research (e.g., Chen, 2006, Weiss, 2010) .
Prior research suggests that the key to understanding sticky cost behavior is to view many costs as arising from deliberate resource commitment decisions made by managers, and speculates that adjustment costs play a central role in these decisions (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . Prior research also informally describes the basic tradeoff that managers would face in the presence of adjustment costs. In particular, in deciding how much to cut committed resources when activity levels drop, managers would weigh the benefits of more efficient operations against the adjustment costs to be incurred. This would lead them to deliberately retain some of the underutilized resources in order to save on the adjustment costs. At the same time, managers have much less discretion about acquiring required resources when activity increases. Thus, to the extent that managers recognize the role of adjustment costs and the associated tradeoffs, adjustment costs are expected to moderate the extent of resource reductions for activity decreases without a commensurate effect for activity increases, leading to cost stickiness (Anderson et al., 2003) .
While the sticky costs literature alludes to the potential role of adjustment costs and deliberate managerial decisions, the issue of optimal decisions in the presence of adjustment costs has been explored in much greater depth in the literature on dynamic factor demand in economics (e.g., Hamermesh, 1990 , Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 , Caballero, 1991 , Abel and Eberly, 1994 , Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996 , Dixit, 1997 , Eberly and Van Mieghem, 1997 , Palm and Pfann, 1997 , Goux et al., 2001 ). This economics literature explicitly models the dynamic optimization problem faced by forward-looking firms in the presence of adjustment costs. As we discuss in section 2, the key tradeoff in this dynamic optimization is between the adjustment costs incurred for a marginal unit of committed resources and the present value of net cash flows this marginal unit is expected to generate over its useful life with the firm (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Abel and Eberly, 1994) . In other words, the firm will optimally increase committed resources as long as the expected net present value for each added unit of resources outweighs the upward adjustment costs. Conversely, it will optimally reduce committed resources as long as the expected net present value for each eliminated unit of resources is negative and large enough (in absolute value) to outweigh the downward adjustment costs.
Besides providing a more nuanced view of the dynamic tradeoffs involved in resource commitment decisions, the dynamic factor demand literature also shows that asymmetry in the adjustment costs leads to asymmetry in the optimal decision rules. For example, Caballero (1991) points out that "in general, for the asymmetric case, the stock of capital responds more to 'good' than to 'bad' realizations" (page 284). Bentolila and Bertola (1990) obtain similar analytical predictions for labor. Thus, the dynamic factor demand literature in economics explicitly derives the cost accounting notion of cost stickiness as a direct consequence of forward-looking optimal decisions in the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs. 1 The economic theory of optimal resource commitment decisions in the presence of adjustment costs provides a plausible and theoretically sound potential explanation for the widely-documented empirical patterns of cost stickiness. We will term this potential explanation for cost stickiness the "economic theory of sticky costs." However, there are other plausible explanations for cost stickiness. For example, stickiness may arise for purely mechanical reasons, since managers can reduce activity levels without cutting the unused resources but they cannot similarly increase activity levels without acquiring the required additional resources. Such physical asymmetry may lead to stickiness even in the absence of any adjustment costs. Alternatively, stickiness may arise due to managers' 1 The dynamic factor demand literature focuses primarily on the implications of adjustment costs for macro outcomes like aggregate employment levels and aggregate business cycle dynamics. The implications for cost stickiness are mostly a useful by-product that has not been emphasized in this literature.
empire-building behavior (Chen et al., 2011) . As we discuss in section 2, while any of these mechanisms can generate cost stickiness in the data, they have different practical implications. Therefore, it is important to directly examine the underlying fundamental mechanism behind cost stickiness. 2 In this paper, we test the central observable implication of the economic theory of sticky costs. As we show in section 2, if cost stickiness reflects deliberate resource commitment decisions by forward-looking managers who recognize the tradeoffs arising due to adjustment costs, then the degree of cost stickiness should be increasing in the magnitude of downward adjustment costs. On the other hand, alternative explanations for cost stickiness do not imply any systematic relationship between adjustment costs and the degree of cost stickiness. This allows us to test the economic theory of sticky costs against alternative explanations.
Despite the importance of adjustment costs in the economic theory of sticky costs, the relationship between adjustment costs and cost stickiness has yet to be tested empirically. The lack of large-sample empirical evidence on this issue is primarily due to the difficulty in measuring adjustment costs. Unlike costs actually incurred to provide productive capacity, adjustment costs are typically opportunity costs not recorded in the accounting system. Thus, direct measurement is hardly feasible, if not impossible, for researchers. Moreover, it is not easy to find suitable research settings in which broad and reliable proxies for the magnitude of adjustment costs are readily available. 3 In this study, we exploit the provisions of employment protection legislation (EPL) as a source of considerable adjustment costs for labor. As previous studies in labor economics have demonstrated, EPL imposes substantial firing costs on firms (e.g., Long and Siebert, 1983, Pissarides, 1999) . This allows us to use indexes of EPL strictness, which are compiled and reported for most OECD countries, as reliable exogenous empirical proxies for the adjustment costs associated with firing workers.
We develop hypotheses on the relationship between the degree of cost stickiness and EPL strictness in different OECD countries. Specifically, we predict that, under the economic theory of sticky costs, a firm operating in a country with more stringent EPL provisions (i.e., greater downward adjustment costs for labor) would exhibit a greater degree of cost stickiness, i.e., a greater degree of asymmetry in cost response to increases and decreases in sales.
We conduct empirical tests of the relationship between EPL strictness (our empirical proxy for labor adjustment costs) and cost stickiness using a large sample of publicly listed companies from 19 OECD countries. The empirical results support our hypotheses and are consistent with the economic theory of sticky costs. In other words, the relationship between cost stickiness and EPL strictness that we observe in the data is consistent with the theory that cost stickiness reflects the outcomes of deliberate resource commitment decisions made by managers who recognize the dynamic tradeoffs that arise because of adjustment costs.
We contribute to the growing literature on cost behavior by demonstrating that the degree of cost stickiness varies across countries as a function of the strictness of EPL -a widely-available empirical measure that has been shown in prior research in economics (e.g., Long and Siebert, 1983 , Lazear, 1990 , Pissarides, 1999 , Blanchard and Portugal, 2001 ) to be a reliable exogenous proxy for the adjustment costs which are central to the economic theory of sticky costs. Our results show that a full understanding of cost behavior in general and of cost stickiness in particular requires careful analysis not only of the firm-specific factors analyzed in prior literature but also of the economy-wide structural forces that shape managers' resource adjustment decisions. This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the economic theory of sticky costs and employment protection legislation, and derive the empirical hypotheses.
In section 3, we describe the data and the empirical models. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
Sticky costs and employment protection legislation
While the traditional textbook view of cost behavior implies a symmetric mechanical relationship between changes in activity and changes in costs, recent research on sticky costs (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003 , Balakrishnan et al., 2004 , Banker et al., 2010a , Weiss, 2010 ) documents pervasive patterns of asymmetric cost behavior (stickiness and antistickiness 4 ) which are inconsistent with the traditional view.
In an effort to explain the source of such asymmetries in cost behavior, the sticky costs literature suggests that many costs arise as a result of deliberate resource commitment decisions made by managers. When managers adjust committed resources, they have to incur adjustment costs such as hiring and firing costs for labor, or installation and disposal costs for equipment. The sticky costs literature speculates that adjustment costs play a central role in cost behavior, and alludes to the dynamic tradeoffs that managers would face in the presence of adjustment costs. In particular, in deciding how much to adjust committed resources in response to a given contemporaneous change in activity, managers would weigh the profit consequences of carrying too much or too little capacity against the adjustment costs that would have to be incurred when changing the committed resources in the current period and in the future (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . To the extent that managers recognize this tradeoff in their decisions, it would introduce more complex dynamics in cost behavior, 5 giving rise to patterns of stickiness and anti-stickiness.
While the sticky costs literature informally describes some of the dynamic considerations that arise because of adjustment costs, this dynamic tradeoff has been modeled formally in the literature on dynamic factor demand in economics (e.g., Hamermesh, 1990 , Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 , Caballero, 1991 , Abel and Eberly, 1994 Formally, we say that costs are "sticky" if they increase more for a one-percent increase in activity than they decrease for an equivalent decrease in activity. Conversely, costs are "anti-sticky" (Weiss, 2010) if they increase less for a one-percent increase in activity than they decrease for an equivalent decrease in activity. 5 Specifically, managers' resource adjustment decisions would be driven not only by the contemporaneous changes in activity, but also by the level of capacity carried over from the prior period (since it affects the amount of adjustment costs that would have to be incurred to achieve the desired capacity level in the current period) and by managers' expectations for future activity levels (since they affect the amount of adjustment costs that would have to be incurred to achieve the desired levels of capacity in the future). Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996 , Dixit, 1997 , Eberly and Van Mieghem, 1997 , Palm and Pfann, 1997 , Goux et al., 2001 ). This economics literature explicitly models the dynamic optimization problem faced by forward-looking firms in the presence of adjustment costs.
At the optimal level of committed resources in this dynamic optimization, the marginal adjustment costs incurred per unit of committed resources in the current period should be equal to the present value of expected net cash flows generated by the marginal unit of committed resources over its useful life with the firm (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Abel and Eberly, 1994) . For example, in the context of optimal hiring and firing decisions, the present value of net cash flows generated by a marginal worker consists of the marginal revenue product she is expected to generate over her tenure with the firm net of her wages over the same period, and net of the expected future firing costs that will be incurred at the (random) end of her tenure, all discounted to the present period (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) . The firm will optimally hire additional workers as long as the present value of expected net cash flows of the marginal worker exceeds the hiring costs (upward adjustment costs per worker). Conversely, the firm will optimally fire workers if the present value of net cash flows of the marginal worker is negative and large enough (in absolute value) to exceed the firing costs (downward adjustment costs). In other words, it will fire workers only if it is costlier for the firm to keep them than to fire them.
Furthermore, after the firm has fired the optimal amount of workers, the net present value of the marginal surviving worker will still be negative (equal to the firing cost with a minus sign), i.e., the firm will optimally retain some of its underutilized workers in order to save on the firing costs.
One key insight from the dynamic factor demand literature is that asymmetry in the adjustment costs translates into asymmetry in the optimal resource commitment decisions (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Caballero, 1991) . For example, in the context of labor resource adjustment decisions, if the firing costs per worker are larger than the hiring costs, then the firm will be more reluctant to fire workers when demand drops than to hire workers when demand increases by an equivalent amount. In particular, the firm will hire additional workers only if the favorable demand shock is strong enough to increase the net present value of its marginal worker to above the hiring threshold, equal to the hiring cost per worker. Likewise, the firm will fire workers only if the adverse demand shock is strong enough to reduce the net present value of its marginal worker to below the firing threshold -a negative number equal to minus the firing cost per worker. 6 If the firing costs are larger than the hiring costs, the adverse demand shocks that trigger the firing decision would have to be relatively more severe than the favorable demand shocks that trigger the hiring decision. In other words, the firm will be less likely to fire workers for activity decreases than to hire workers for equivalent activity increases. Thus, the dynamic factor demand literature in economics explicitly derives the cost accounting notion of cost stickiness as a direct consequence of forward-looking optimizing behavior in the presence of asymmetric adjustment costs.
The economic theory of optimal resource commitment decisions in the presence of adjustment costs provides a plausible and theoretically sound potential explanation for the widely-documented empirical patterns of cost stickiness. We will term this potential explanation for cost stickiness the "economic theory of cost stickiness." However, there are other plausible explanations for cost stickiness. For example, stickiness may arise for purely mechanical reasons, since it is physically impossible to increase activity levels without acquiring the required additional resources, but at the same time it is physically possible to reduce the activity levels without cutting the unused resources. Furthermore, cutting the unused resources requires substantial managerial discretion and effort (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . This may lead to stickiness, even in the absence of any adjustment costs, if managers do not exercise sufficient discretion and effort in identifying and eliminating the unused resources. Alternatively, stickiness may arise due to managers' empire-building behavior (Chen et al., 2011) , since empire-building managers will be eager to expand the resources under their control when activity increases but reluctant to cut back unused resources when activity declines. This may also lead to cost stickiness even in the absence of adjustment costs.
While any of these explanations may lead to cost stickiness in the data, they have very different implications. In particular, if stickiness arises due to mechanical reasons or due to empire-building behavior, it would reflect the consequences of wasteful managerial behavior that reduces firm value. On the other hand, under the economic theory of sticky costs (i.e., dynamic optimization by managers in the presence of adjustment costs), the same observed pattern of stickiness would represent the consequences of desirable managerial behavior that increases firm value. Therefore, it is important to examine the underlying fundamental mechanism behind cost stickiness.
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In this paper, we exploit the central testable implication of the economic theory of sticky costs in order to test it against alternative explanations. As we discuss next, the economic theory of sticky costs implies a systematic positive relationship between the magnitude of downward adjustment costs and the degree of cost stickiness, which can be tested using appropriate empirical proxies for the magnitude of adjustment costs. At the same time, alternative explanations mentioned above do not imply any clear relationship between the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of cost stickiness.
In deriving our predictions, we build on prior literature on dynamic factor demand in economics (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 , Caballero, 1991 , Abel and Eberly, 1994 .
While this prior literature has focused primarily on the macroeconomic implications of adjustment costs for aggregate employment levels and business cycle dynamics, we leverage their insights to generate our predictions for firm-level resource commitment decisions made by managers and their implications for firm-level cost behavior. For clarity of exposition, we describe the relationship between downward adjustment costs and stickiness in the context of labor resources, where the adjustment costs are the firing and hiring costs per employee (the intuition for other capacity resources is similar). When the firing costs per employee are higher, it affects the hiring and firing decisions through two channels. First, conditional on the original level of the work force carried over from the prior period, higher firing costs moderate the magnitudes of both the hiring decisions for activity increases and the firing decisions for activity decreases. As we explain below, this moderating effect of higher firing costs is disproportionately larger for activity decreases than for activity increases. As a result, conditional on the original level of the work force, higher firing costs increase the degree of cost stickiness. Second, higher firing costs affect the typical level of the work force (and hence the typical level of slack labor) carried over from the prior period. As we explain below, higher firing costs reduce the average amount of slack labor carried over from the prior period, which further amplifies cost stickiness.
The intuition for the first channel is as follows. In its hiring decisions, the firm will keep adding workers as long as the net present value of the marginal worker is positive and above the hiring cost per worker (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990, Goux et al., 2001) .
Similarly, in its firing decisions, the firm will keep laying off workers as long as the net present value of the marginal worker is negative and below the firing cost per worker (with a minus sign 8 ). In other words, the firm will fire workers if the cost of keeping them (i.e., negative present value) exceeds the cost of firing them. When the firing costs per worker are higher, it reduces the net present value of the marginal worker by making it costlier for the firm to lay off this worker in the future if necessary. 9 In other words, by increasing the anticipated cost of future layoffs, higher firing costs make the marginal worker less valuable for the firm, both in the context of hiring decisions and in the context of firing decisions (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) . As a result, for the same increase in activity (and for the same original level of the work force), the firm will optimally hire fewer additional workers, since the (unchanged) hiring costs per worker are now traded off against lower net present value generated by this worker. In the context of firing decisions, higher firings costs have a similar negative effect on the net present value of the marginal worker, making it less desirable for the firm to keep the marginal worker. However, unlike in the hiring context, higher firing costs have an additional direct effect of making it even less desirable for the firm to lay off the marginal worker. The latter effect will dominate since the firing costs have to be incurred immediately and with certainty when laying off workers, while the anticipated future firing costs embedded in the net present value of the marginal worker will be incurred only in the future (and therefore are discounted), and they will be incurred only if future shocks turn out to be sufficiently adverse to necessitate layoffs (and not with certainty).
As a result, for the same decrease in activity (and for the same original level of the work force), the firm will optimally lay off fewer workers when the firing costs are higher, since the costs associated with firing workers increase to a greater extent than the costs (negative present value) associated with retaining underutilized workers. Thus, for a given original level of the work force carried over from the prior period, higher firing costs will moderate both the hiring decisions for activity increases and the firing decisions for activity decreases, and this moderating effect will be disproportionately stronger for the firing decisions. 10 This will increase the degree of cost stickiness (or reduce the degree of anti-stickiness in situations in which labor is anti-sticky 11 ).
Second, higher firing costs will affect the typical levels of slack labor carried over from the prior period, which will further affect the degree of cost stickiness (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2004) . Firing costs have two offsetting effects on the amount of slack.
On the one hand, by moderating the firing decisions for activity decreases, higher firing costs increase the amount of slack labor (e.g., Bentolila and Bertola, 1990) . On the other hand, by moderating the hiring decisions for activity increases, higher firing costs decrease the amount of slack labor. On average, we expect the latter effect to dominate since activity increases are much more common in the data than activity decreases (64.1 percent increases vs. 35.9 percent decreases in our sample). This will result in less slack carried over from the prior period on average. In turn, this will further moderate the firing decisions for activity decreases, since there are fewer underutilized workers to begin with.
At the same time, less slack will amplify the hiring decisions for activity increases, since managers will have to hire more additional workers to accommodate a given activity increase. Consequently, by reducing the average amount of slack, higher firing costs will further increase the degree of cost stickiness (or reduce the degree of anti-stickiness in situations in which labor is anti-sticky).
Summing up, under the economic theory of sticky costs, higher firing costs will increase the degree of cost stickiness (or reduce the degree of anti-stickiness) for labor, via both channels discussed above. The same intuition applies more generally for any type of capacity resources that are costly to adjust. Higher downward adjustment costs will increase the degree of cost stickiness (or reduce the degree of cost anti-stickiness), while higher upward adjustment costs will reduce the degree of stickiness (or increase the degree of anti-stickiness). This implication is central to the economic theory of sticky costs, and adjustment costs are one of the key determinants of cost behavior if this theory is valid.
At the same time, alternative explanations for cost stickiness do not imply any systematic relationship between the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of cost stickiness. For example, if cost stickiness arises for mechanical reasons due to managers' failure to identify and eliminate unused resources, we would not expect any systematic relationship between the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of managerial inattention that is driving stickiness under this explanation. Similarly, if cost stickiness arises due to managers' empire-building behavior, we would not expect any systematic relationship between the magnitude of adjustment costs and the intensity of empirebuilding incentives. This difference allows us to test the observable implications of the economic theory of sticky costs against alternative explanations.
Despite the importance of adjustment costs in the economic theory of sticky costs, few studies have been able to test the relationship between adjustment costs and cost stickiness empirically. The main complication in testing this relationship is that adjustment costs are hard to measure directly. As Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) point out, many of the adjustment costs are implicit costs of lost output, 12 not explicit monetary costs captured in the accounting system. Despite this complication, several studies have been able to test this relationship by relying on observable firm-level proxies for the magnitude of adjustment costs such as asset and employee intensity (Anderson et al., 2003) or sales volatility (Kama and Weiss, 2010) , and by linking these proxies to firmlevel variation in cost stickiness. In contrast, in this paper we exploit country-level proxies for adjustment costs for labor, based on the strictness of employment protection legislation in each country, and we link them to cross-country variation in cost stickiness (in addition, we also control for firm-level drivers of cost stickiness following prior literature). Compared to proxies for adjustment costs used in prior literature such as asset intensity or sales volatility, one key advantage of employment protection measures is that they are exogenous with respect to managers' resource commitment decisions.
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Employment protection legislation (EPL), our empirical proxy for labor adjustment costs, is a central part of firms' institutional environment. EPL describes rules about dismissal of employees, such as restrictions on firing after some period of service, the compulsory payment of redundancy payments and the length of notice required before dismissal. Acting as a tax on dismissals, employment protection imposes substantial firing costs on employers (Long and Siebert, 1983 , Pissarides, 1999 , OECD, 2004 . 14 As we document in section 3, there are large differences in EPL strictness across the countries in our data, providing a rich source of exogenous cross-country variation in the firing costs.
Prior research in labor economics has documented extensively that EPL plays a substantial role in macroeconomic outcomes such as labor force participation, job creation and destruction, unemployment and productivity growth. Lazear (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) , Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) , Mortensen and Pissarides In contrast, measures like asset intensity or sales volatility are in part outcomes of prior managerial decisions in response to shocks that may still have a persistent direct effect on cost behavior in the current period. 14 For example, in Portugal, which has the strictest EPL in our data, mandated severance pay is equal to 3 months of regular pay for a worker with 9 months of tenure, and it increases to 20 months of regular pay for a worker with 20 years of tenure (OECD, 2004) . (2001) and Caballero (2004) find that stricter EPL reduces firms' ability to adjust to shocks.
Thus, prior research in labor economics documents that (1) EPL is a major determinant of firing costs, and (2) it has important effects for a wide range of macroeconomic outcomes. We exploit the same cross-country institutional variation in EPL, however our main focus is different: we are interested in the role of EPL in firmlevel cost behavior (which is of interest to firm managers in planning resource levels and costs) rather than its role in macroeconomic outcomes (which is of interest for policymakers in formulating broad macroeconomic policy). Despite the different focus of our study, we are able to leverage the key insights from these previous studies regarding the impact of EPL on adjustment costs to develop our empirical hypotheses.
As we discuss above, the economic theory of sticky costs implies that higher downward adjustment costs should lead to more stickiness in resource adjustment. Since stricter EPL increases the magnitude of firing costs (downward adjustment costs for labor), we expect it to increase the degree of stickiness for labor costs, and, since direct and indirect labor costs account for a large fraction of operating costs, we expect it to increase the degree of stickiness for operating costs. 15 This leads us to our first empirical hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Stricter employment protection legislation (EPL) is associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness for operating costs.
Differential effects of EPL for regular and temporary employees
Overall employment protection legislation provisions consist of two distinct components: employment protection for regular employees and regulation of temporary forms of employment (see Table 1 and section 3 for details). As we show in section 3, there are significant cross-country differences in relative employment protection for temporary vs. regular employees, i.e., some countries have strict EPL for regular but not for temporary employees and vice versa.
Both forms of EPL are likely to affect the magnitude of downward adjustment costs for labor. In particular, EPL for regular workers specifies the severance pay levels, which gives rise to explicit monetary costs associated with firing regular workers (e.g., OECD, 2004) . It also specifies the regulations and procedures that constrain employer's ability to fire workers, such as notice length and notification procedures before dismissal or the rules related to unfair dismissal, which give rise to additional, non-monetary, firing costs.
EPL for temporary employees also affects labor adjustment costs, but through a different channel. In particular, it constrains employers' ability to use temporary workers (who have low firing costs) instead of regular workers (who have much higher firing costs).
Thus, stricter EPL for temporary employees increases the effective monetary and nonmonetary firing costs that employers face, by shifting the composition of their work force from temporary to regular employees.
Stricter EPL for regular workers and stricter EPL for temporary workers both increase the downward adjustment costs for labor. Therefore, based on the economic theory of sticky costs, we expect both forms of EPL to increase the degree of cost stickiness for labor costs, and, since labor costs represent a large fraction of total operating costs, we expect them to increase the degree of stickiness for operating costs.
This leads us to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Stricter employment protection for regular employees is associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness for operating costs.
Hypothesis 2b: Stricter employment protection for temporary employees is associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness for operating costs.
The relative magnitudes of the effects of regular and temporary EPL on cost stickiness are a priori ambiguous. For example, companies may use temporary employees in all areas of operations, in which case they will be able to accommodate most of the fluctuations in their labor requirements by adjusting the number of temporary workers, taking advantage of the much lower firing costs for them relative to regular workers. In this case, even though temporary employees account for a relatively small fraction of the total work force, they would account for most of the changes in individual companies' work force. If so, EPL for temporary workers would have a much greater effect on the degree of cost stickiness than EPL for regular workers. Conversely, the use of temporary workers may be confined to a relatively narrow subset of operations (for example, generic tasks that can be accomplished without much firm-specific human capital and experience). If so, labor force adjustments would involve hiring and firing regular workers alongside temporary workers, in which case EPL for regular workers might have a much stronger effect on cost stickiness than EPL for temporary workers. Thus, a priori either form of EPL (regular or temporary) may have a dominant effect on cost stickiness.
Research methodology
We empirically examine the relationship between country-specific employment protection legislation and cost stickiness for firms in OECD member countries. 16 We choose this research setting primarily for two reasons: (1) OECD includes all the major industrialized nations with a free market economy, and (2) measures of country-specific EPL and other labor market characteristics are reliably and systematically reported. In addition, as discussed in the previous section, there is a rich literature in labor economics that has examined various aspects of EPL and other labor market characteristics for OECD countries (e.g., Lazear, 1990 , Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 , Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993 , Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999 , Heckman et al., 2000 , Botero et al., 2004 , and many others). Since our main goal in this study is to explore the relationship between EPL and cost behavior, we are able to leverage this literature both in formulating our empirical hypotheses and in identifying the appropriate empirical measures of EPL and additional labor market control variables.
Measures of employment protection legislation
To measure the strictness of employment protection legislation for regular and temporary employees, we use indexes defined and reported in OECD (2004). These indexes are based on the legislative provisions governing the firing of workers (such as the length of the notice period before dismissal, or the level of severance pay), as well as regulations related to temporary forms of employment (such as the maximum duration of successive fixed-term contracts, or restrictions on employment through temp agencies).
For each country, OECD (2004) characterizes employment protection legislation for regular and temporary employees along 14 basic items, and then combines them into summary indexes of EPL strictness for regular employees REGEPL n and temporary employees TEMPEPL n for country n (see Table 1 for details). These indexes are normalized to range from 0 to 6, with higher scores representing stricter regulation. vs. the median of 1.6). At the opposite extreme, the Netherlands has one of the strictest levels of EPL for regular employees (3.1), but below-median levels of EPL for temporary employees (1.2, vs. the median of 1.6).
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We start by drawing the full sample of publicly-listed non-financial firms from
Compustat (Global and North America) between 1988-2008 for the 19 OECD countries we focus on. 19 We deflate sales and operating costs to control for inflation, using countryspecific GDP deflators. We discard firm-years if: (1) sales or operating costs are missing or negative in current or two prior years, (2) operating costs are less than 50% or more than 200% of sales in current or two prior years, or (3) assets are missing or negative in current year. We also discard firms reporting in a non-native currency (for example, European firms reporting in US dollars). 20 After that, we discard 1% outliers on each tail for the dependent variable (log-change in deflated operating costs) and for the continuous firm-level explanatory variables (log-change in deflated sales and asset intensity). We also discard firm-years if deflated sales increased by over 50% or dropped by over 33% We merge this sample with the EPL data described earlier and additional countrylevel control variables from several sources. The data on annual GDP growth rates and inflation rates (GDP deflators) for each country is from the World Bank Databank. 23 The data on labor market control variables in robustness checks (union density, bargaining coordination and centralization index and unemployment benefits index) is from OECD (2004) and Nickell et al. (2005) . The variable definitions in estimation are summarized in Table 2 . 19 For most OECD countries in Global Compustat, data is available only starting from 1988. For consistency, we start the sample in 1988 for all countries in our data. 20 The results are similar when we do not discard such firms. 21 These percentage cutoffs (-33% and +50%) are symmetric when transformed into the log-change form (ln(2/3) and ln(3/2) respectively) that we use in estimation. 22 The first two lags in the raw data are used up in computing the first differences and preparing the control variables, so the final sample in estimation starts in 1990 rather than in 1988. 23 http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3 . Besides large differences in EPL discussed in the previous subsection, there are important cross-country differences in other variables. For example, average annual GDP growth ranges from 1.1 percent in
Italy and 1.3 percent in Japan to 6.2 percent in Ireland. The average annual log-change in deflated sales ranges from 0.022 (2.2 percent a year) for Japanese firms to 0.051 (5.1 percent) for Swedish firms and 0.053 (5.3 percent) for Irish firms. As Anderson et al. (2003) and Banker et al. (2010b) show, managers' optimism and pessimism regarding future sales play an important role in sticky cost behavior. Thus, the cross-country differences in growth rates are likely to lead to large cross-country differences in cost stickiness due to differences in managers' expectations. Therefore, in the empirical analysis, we include empirical proxies for managers' optimism and pessimism following Anderson et al. (2003) to control for cross-country and within-country differences in managers' expectations regarding future sales.
Empirical model
Our empirical estimation is based on a hierarchical linear model on which the behavior of a level-1 outcome (i.e., firm-level cost behavior) is postulated to be a function of level-2 explanatory variables (i.e., country-level characteristics) and firmlevel control variables. We next specify the level-1 and level-2 models and discuss the model structure in detail.
We begin with the following firm-level model of cost behavior linking annual changes in deflated operating costs (XOPR) to contemporaneous changes in deflated sales revenue (SALE), which follows the sticky costs model of Noreen and Soderstrom (1997) 
where ∆lnXOPR n,i,t represents the log-change in deflated operating costs for firm i in country n in year t, ∆lnSALE n,i,t is the log-change in deflated sales, DEC n,i,t is a binary variable equal to one if deflated sales decreased in year t and zero otherwise, u n,i,t is an error term that has mean zero and is independent of the explanatory variables, and the slopes α 1,n,i,t and α 2,n,i,t are specified in detail below. In this specification, the slope α 1,n,i,t approximates the percentage change in costs for a one percent increase in sales, and 
where GDPGROWTH n,t represents real GDP growth rate in country n in year t, AINT n,i,t represents asset intensity (log ratio of total assets to sales) for firm i in year t, LAW n is a binary variable equal to one for common-law countries, DEC n,i,t-1 is a binary variable equal to one if sales decreased in prior period, EPL n is the employment protection legislation index for country n, and v 1,n , v 2,n are country-level random effects. Following prior literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) , we use GDP growth (GDPGROWTH n,t ) and a dummy for successive decreases in sales (DEC n,i,t-1 24 ) as empirical proxies for managers' optimism or pessimism regarding future sales, and we use asset intensity (AINT n,i,t ) as an empirical proxy for the magnitude of adjustment costs facing the firm.
25
We include the common-law dummy LAW n (equal to one for Australia, Canada, Ireland, UK and US), since prior research in economics (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997 Porta et al., , 1998 Porta et al., , 2000 Djankov et al., 2007) has found that the legal origin of a country (common law vs. code law) is one of the primary drivers of cross-country differences in corporate governance, access to external finance, business regulation and other outcomes that likely play an important role in firm-level cost behavior. 26 The country-level random effects v 1,n , v 2,n capture the cross-country differences in cost behavior that are not accounted for by the observable explanatory variables. By construction, v 1,n , v 2,n have mean zero and they are independent of the explanatory variables in the regression. The main parameter of interest in estimation is β 11 , which captures the relationship between the strictness of EPL and the degree of cost stickiness. Hypothesis 1 implies that β 11 should be negative, i.e., stricter EPL should be associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness (a more negative α 2,n,i,t ).
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By combining equation (1) with (2a) and (2b), we obtain our basic estimation model: 
where ε n,i,t is the error term, which combines the residuals from equations (1), (2a) and (2b), and the rest of the terms have been described above. The error term ε n,i,t can be rewritten as
where the original random shocks u n,i,t , v 1,n , v 2,n from equations (1), (2a), (2b) have mean zero and are independent of the explanatory variables in the regression. Consequently, the combined error term ε n,i,t in equation (3) has zero mean for any value of the explanatory variables, and therefore ordinary least squares (OLS) yields unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (3). The inclusion of country-level random effects v 1,n , v 2,n introduces cross-sectional correlation in ε n,i,t across firms within each country. It also introduces heteroskedasticity, since the random shocks v 1,n , v 2,n are multiplied by ∆lnSALE and DEC×∆lnSALE respectively. To deal with these issues, we use clustered standard errors (Rogers, 1993) with clustering by country.
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26 Calleja et al. (2006) also find (for a limited sample of four developed countries) that legal origin plays a role in cost behavior. 27 We also control for EPL strictness in the slope for increases α 1,n,i,t since EPL strictness is likely to affect firms' hiring decisions for activity increases. However, as we discuss in section 2, the expected sign of this effect is a priori ambiguous. 28 Alternatively, instead of using OLS with appropriately clustered standard errors, we could estimate Model A as a random-coefficients model using maximum likelihood. However, this approach would be less
We also estimate an extended model (Model B), in which we replace the aggregate EPL index (EPL n ) with two more detailed indexes, which measure the strictness of EPL separately for regular and temporary employees. The slope coefficients in Model (B) are specified as: 
where REGEPL n represents the index of regular employment protection in country n, TEMPEPL n is the index of temporary employment regulation in country n, and the rest of the terms have been described above. The main parameters of interest in estimation are β 12 and β 13 . Hypotheses 2a, 2b imply that β 12 and β 13 should both be negative, i.e., an increase in strictness of EPL for regular or temporary employees should be associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness (a more negative stickiness coefficient α 2,n,i,t ).
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Proceeding similarly to Model A above, we obtain the estimation equation for Model B by combining equation (1) 
We estimate Model B using OLS with standard errors clustered by country.
In robustness checks, we introduce additional labor market control variables (union density, collective bargaining coordination and centralization index, and unemployment benefits index) in the slope coefficients α 1,n,i,t , α 2,n,i,t . The final estimation models in these robust, since it would require us to impose additional distributional assumptions on the error terms in equations (1) and (2a), (2b), including their time-series structure, and it would yield consistent estimates only if these additional distributional assumptions hold in the data. When we impose these additional assumptions and estimate Model A as a random-coefficients model using maximum likelihood, the main results are similar. 29 We also control for REGEPL n and TEMPEPL n in the slope for increases α 1,n,i,t since these variables are likely to affect firms' hiring decisions for increases in sales. As we discuss in section 2, the expected sign of this effect is a priori ambiguous. robustness checks are analogous to Models A and B above, with additional interaction terms for the labor market controls.
Empirical results
We present the main estimation results for Model A in column (a) of Table 4 . The coefficients on the control variables (asset intensity, GDP growth and a dummy for successive decreases in sales) have the expected signs and are consistent with the findings in prior literature for the US data (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . The main parameter of interest is β 11 , which captures the association between the strictness of employment protection legislation EPL n and the degree of cost stickiness. The estimate is β 11 =-0.044 (t=-4.03) , negative and significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, stricter EPL in our data is associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness (i.e., a more negative stickiness coefficient α 2,n,i,t ), lending strong support to Hypothesis 1.
In addition to being statistically significant, the magnitude of β 11 is also economically significant. For example, if we compare Switzerland (the country with the least strict EPL in continental Europe) and Portugal (the country with the strictest EPL in continental Europe), the predicted cost stickiness coefficient for a firm in Portugal is 0.11 higher (in absolute value) than the stickiness coefficient for an equivalent firm in Switzerland. For comparison, the average degree of cost stickiness in the full sample is -0.090, i.e., the degree of cross-country variation in cost stickiness driven by EPL has the same order of magnitude as the average cost stickiness coefficient.
As a first robustness check, we split the full sample period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) into two shorter time periods, 1990-2000 and 2001-2008, 30 and re-estimate Model A separately for each subsample (columns (b) and (c) in Table 4 ). The estimates of β 11 are negative and significant at the 5 percent level in both subsamples (β 11 =-0.046, t=-2.14 between 1990-2000, and β 11 =-0.056, t=-2.34 between 2001-2008) =-0.048, t=-4.15 ) are very similar to our original estimates for the full sample. In another robustness check, we add control for other country-level labor market characteristics (trade union density, an index of collective bargaining coordination and centralization, and an index of unemployment benefits) that are likely to affect the magnitude of adjustment costs for labor and consequently affect the degree of cost stickiness. The estimation results are presented in Table 6 . The estimates of β 11 are close in magnitude and significance levels to the original estimates in 
Results for regular and temporary employment protection measures (Model B)
As we discuss in subsection 3.1, our measure of overall employment protection legislation in Model A (EPL n ) combines two more detailed EPL indexes, employment protection for regular employees (REGEPL n ) and regulation of temporary forms of employment (TEMPEPL n ), which may have important differential effects.
We use Model B to examine the effects of regular and temporary EPL indexes on cost stickiness. The main estimation results are presented in column (a) of Table 5 . The coefficients on the control variables (GDP growth, asset intensity and a dummy for successive decreases in sales) have the expected signs and are consistent with the findings in prior literature for the US data (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) . The main parameters of interest are β 12 (the coefficient on regular employment protection index REGEPL n ) and β 13 (the coefficient on temporary employment regulation index TEMPEPL n ). The coefficient for regular EPL (β 12 ) is negative but not significant at the 10 percent level (β 12 =-0.015, t=-1.54), while the coefficient for temporary EPL (β 13 ) is negative and significant at the 0.001 percent level (β 13 =-0.027, t=-6.20) . These smaller insignificant estimates for regular EPL suggest that companies are able to successfully bypass most of the EPL restrictions on firing regular workers by relying on temporary workers to accommodate most of the changes in their work force. 32 However, the insignificant estimates for regular EPL could also be due to multicollinearity (the correlation between regular and temporary EPL in our sample is 0.789). While the estimates indicate that REGEPL n and TEMPEPL n are jointly significant and affect the degree of cost stickiness in the direction consistent with Hypotheses 2a, 2b, the inferences regarding the role of each EPL variable separately are less informative due to multicollinearity. To get a better sense of the effects of independent variation in REGEPL n and TEMPEPL n , we do the following. First, we regress TEMPEPL n on REGEPL n , and compute the residual rTEMPEPL n in this regression. By construction, this residual captures the portion of variation in TEMPEPL n that is orthogonal to (uncorrelated with) REGEPL n . 33 After that, we re-estimate Model B after replacing the original TEMPEPL n with the residual rTEMPEPL n . 34 The estimate of β 12 in this modified regression captures the effect of common variation in REGEPL n and TEMPEPL n , while the estimate of β 13 captures the effect of independent variation in TEMPEPL n . The coefficients on both variables in this modified regression are negative and significant at the 1 percent level (β 12 =-0.035, t=-3.17, β 13 =-0.027, t=-6.20) , indicating that both the common variation in regular and temporary EPL and the independent variation in temporary EPL have a significant association with the degree of cost stickiness, supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b.
This association is also economically significant. For example, if regular and temporary EPL indexes change from their levels in Switzerland (the country with the lowest EPL in continental Europe) to their levels in France (a country with relatively stringent EPL), it would increase the cost stickiness coefficient by 0.084 (in absolute value), which is nearly the same as the average cost stickiness coefficient in our sample (-0.090).
As a first robustness check, we split the full sample period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) Table 5 ). The estimates of β 13 (the coefficient on TEMPEPL n ) are negative and significant in both subsamples (β 13 =-0.036, t=-2.45 between 1990-2000, and β 13 =-0.020, t=-2.84 between 2001-2008) , while β 12 is negative and significant between 2001-2008 but not between 1990-2000 (β 12 =-0.041, t=-2.19 between 2001-2008, and β 12 =-0.008, t=-0.54 between 1990-2000) . As discussed above, since EPL indexes for regular and temporary employees are strongly positively correlated, the interpretation of individual coefficients is complicated by multicollinearity. 35 When we redefine the EPL variables to separate common variation in regular and temporary EPL from independent variation in temporary EPL using the procedure described above, both coefficients are negative and significant at the 5 percent level in both subsamples (β 12 =-0.037, t=-2.02 and β 13 =-0.036, t=-2.45 between 1990-2000; β 12 =-0.056, t=-2.46 and β 13 =-0.020, t=-2.84 between 2001-2008) , lending further support to Hypotheses 2a, 2b.
Since the US data accounts for 35 percent of the full sample and therefore could have a disproportionate impact on the results, we also re-estimate the model after discarding the US from the sample. The estimation results without the US are very similar in magnitude and significance (column (d) in Table 5 ). In another robustness check, we add control for other country-level labor market characteristics (trade union density, an index of collective bargaining coordination and centralization, and an index of unemployment benefits) that are likely to affect the magnitude of adjustment costs for labor and consequently affect the degree of cost stickiness. The estimation results are presented in Table 7 . The estimates of β 12 , β 13 are again very close in magnitude and significance levels to the original estimates in Table 5 . Like in the original estimates, the coefficient on temporary EPL is negative and significant at any reasonable significance level (β 13 =-0.023, t=-5.35 ) while the coefficient on regular EPL is negative but insignificant (β 12 =-0.011, t=-1.24). As discussed above, the insignificant estimates for regular EPL suggest that companies are able to bypass most of the EPL restrictions for regular workers by relying on temporary workers, however this could also reflect multicollinearity. When we redefine the EPL variables to separate between common variation in regular and temporary EPL and independent variation in temporary EPL using the procedure described above, both coefficients are negative and significant (β 12 =-0.029, t=-2.65 and β 13 =-0.023, t=-5.35 ). Thus, both the common variation in regular and temporary EPL and the independent variation in temporary EPL significantly increase the degree of cost stickiness even after controlling for the main labor market Summing up, the estimation results for a single aggregate measure of EPL (Model A) indicate that stricter EPL is associated with a higher degree of cost stickiness, supporting our main empirical hypothesis. When we decompose the overall EPL index into two more detailed measures of EPL strictness, those for regular and temporary employees (Model B), the estimates for both measures confirm our main findings. The estimates for Model B also indicate that the association with cost stickiness is stronger for temporary EPL than for regular EPL, which may suggest that companies are able to successfully bypass many of the EPL restrictions for regular workers by relying more on temporary workers. 37 In both models, the association between EPL strictness and cost stickiness is significant both statistically and economically, and the results are robust to alternative specifications. These results support the central premise of the economic theory of sticky costs, that cost behavior reflects deliberate resource-adjustment decisions by forward-looking managers who recognize the dynamic tradeoffs associated with adjustment costs, in the empirical context of labor resources.
Conclusion
In this study we investigated the relationship between employment protection legislation (EPL) in different countries and sticky cost behavior. The basic premise in the economic theory of sticky costs is that many costs arise as a result of deliberate resource commitment decisions made by forward-looking managers in the presence of adjustment costs. Adjustment costs play a central role in this theory, giving rise to dynamic patterns of sticky cost behavior which are inconsistent with the standard textbook view of cost 36 In one specification, we compute the growth rate for firm i as the average log-change in its deflated sales over the entire sample period. In another specification, we compute the growth rate for firm i in year t as the average log-change in its deflated sales between year t-4...t. 37 Due to the high correlation between regular and temporary EPL, the estimates of their separate effects are less precise than the estimates of their combined effect. Therefore, more caution is required in interpreting their relative magnitudes.
behavior. A central testable implication of this theory is that the degree of cost stickiness should be increasing in the magnitude of (downward) adjustment costs for capacity resources. However, empirical tests of this theory have been hampered by the fact that adjustment costs are hard to measure directly. In this study, we leveraged prior literature in labor economics on the structural features of the labor market, and exploited crosscountry variation in the strictness of employment protection legislation for OECD countries to test the theory of sticky costs. Cross-country variation in EPL strictness provides a reliable exogenous source of variation in adjustment costs for labor resources, since EPL is the primary source of firing costs for employers (e.g., Long and Siebert, 1983, Pissarides, 1999) . Based on the economic theory of sticky costs, we hypothesized that firms in countries with stricter employment protection should exhibit a greater degree of cost stickiness.
We tested our hypotheses using a large sample of firms in 19 OECD countries. The empirical results strongly support our hypotheses, reinforcing the notion that observed cost behavior is driven by deliberate resource commitment decisions made by forwardlooking managers who recognize the role of adjustment costs. The relationship between the strictness of EPL and the degree of cost stickiness is also highly economically significant, and the estimation results are robust to alternative model specifications.
Our study is the first in the literature to explicitly consider and test the link between economy-wide structural variables and sticky cost behavior. Prior literature on cost behavior was conducted almost exclusively using samples of firms from a single country, and as such has largely ignored the impact of economy-wide structural variables on cost behavior. 38 Our results show that a full understanding of cost behavior in general and of cost stickiness in particular requires careful analysis not only of the firm-specific factors but also of the economy-wide structural forces that shape managers' resource adjustment decisions. 38 The only exception we are aware of is Calleja et al. (2006) . For each country, EPL is characterized along 14 basic items described in Panels A and B below. As a first step in computing these indexes in OECD (2004), each basic item is renormalized into a cardinal score ranging from 0 to 6, where higher values represent stricter regulation. After that, the summary indices of EPL are computed as a weighted average of individual items, with weights described in Panel C below. 
Item 1 Notification procedures
Scale 0-3 0 when an oral statement is enough; 1 when a written statement of the reasons for dismissal must be supplied to the employee; 2 when a third party (such as works council or the competent labor authority) must be notified; 3 when the employer cannot proceed to dismissal without authorization from a third party.
Scale (0 -3) × 2
Item 2
Delay involved before notice can start
Days
Estimated time includes, where relevant, the following assumptions: 6 days are counted in case of required warning procedure, 1 day when dismissal can be notified orally or the notice can be directly handed to the employee, 2 days when a letter needs to be sent by mail and 3 days when this must be a registered letter.
≤2 <10 <18 <26 < 35 <45 ≥45 
Item 5
Definition of justified or unfair dismissal Scale 0-3 0 when worker capability or redundancy of the job are adequate and sufficient ground for dismissal; 1 when social considerations, age or job tenure must when possible influence the choice of which worker(s) to dismiss; 2 when a transfer and/or a retraining to adapt the worker to different work must be attempted prior to dismissal; 3 when worker capability cannot be a ground for dismissal.
Item 6
Length of trial period
Months
Period within which, regular contracts are not fully covered by employment protection provisions and unfair dismissal claims can usually not be made.
≥24 >12 >9 >5 >2.5 ≥1.5 <1.5
Item 7 Compensation following unfair dismissal
Months pay ≤3 ≤8 ≤12 ≤18 ≤24 ≤30 >30
Item 8
Possibility of reinstatement following unfair dismissal
Scale 0-3
The extend of reinstatement is based upon whether, after finding of unfair dismissal, the employee has the option of reinstatement into his/her previous job, even if this is against the wishes of the employer.
Panel B. EPL for temporary employees (source: 
Item 9
Valid cases for use of fixed-term contracts (FTC) Scale 0-3 0 fixed-term contracts are permitted only for "objective" or "material situation", i.e. to perform a task which itself is of fixed duration; 1 if specific exemptions apply to situations of employer need (e.g. launching a new activity) or employee need (e.g. workers in search of their first job); 2 when exemption exist on both the employer and employee sides; 3 when there are no restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts.
6 -scale (0 -3) × 2
Item 10
Maximum number of successive FTC XOPR n,i,t -operating costs for firm i in country n in year t, deflated to control for inflation. SALE n,i,t -sales revenue for firm i in country n in year t, deflated to control for inflation. GDPGROWTH n,t -real GDP growth in country n in year t. DEC n,i,t -binary variable equal to one for sales decreases. AINT n,i,t -asset intensity for firm i in country n in year t, computed as the log ratio of assets to sales, ln(AT/SALE). LAW n -binary variable equal to one for common-law countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, UK and US), zero otherwise. REGEPL n -index of employment protection legislation (EPL) for regular employees in country n in late 1990-s, from Table 2 . A2.4 in OECD (2004) . REGEPL n ranges from 0 to 6, and higher values correspond to stricter EPL. TEMPEPL n -index of employment protection legislation (EPL) for temporary employees in country n in late 1990-s, from BNFT n -unemployment benefits index for country n in late 1990-s, from Nickell et al. (2005) .
Sample selection criteria:
We start by drawing the full sample of publicly-listed non-financial firms from Compustat (Global and North America) between 1988-2008 for the 19 OECD countries we focus on. We discard firm-years if: (1) sales or operating costs are missing or negative in current or two prior years, (2) operating costs are less than 50% or more than 200% of sales in current or two prior years, or (3) assets are missing or negative in current year. We also discard firms reporting in a non-native currency (for example, European firms reporting in US dollars). After that, we discard 1% outliers on each tail for the dependent variable (log-change in deflated operating costs) and for the continuous firm-level explanatory variables (logchange in deflated sales and asset intensity). We also discard firm-years if deflated sales increased by over 50% or dropped by over 33% in current or prior year, since such extreme year-on-year changes in sales likely reflect mergers or divestitures. The final sample in estimation contains 128,333 observations for 15,833 firms in 19 OECD countries between 1990-2008. 42 42 The first two lags in the original data is used up to compute first differences and control variables, so the final sample in estimation starts in 1990 rather than in 1988. 
where ∆lnXOPR n,i,t is the log-change in deflated operating costs for firm i in country n in year t, ∆lnSALE n,i,t is the log-change in deflated sales, GDPGROWTH n,t is the real GDP growth rate in country n in year t, AINT n,i,t is asset intensity (log ratio of assets to sales), LAW n is a binary variable equal to one for common-law countries, EPL n is the aggregate employment protection legislation index for country n, DEC n,i,t is a binary variable equal to one if deflated sales decreased in year t, and ε n,i,t is an error term. The sample selection criteria are described in Table 2 (Rogers 1993 ) with clustering by country. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. (Rogers 1993 ) with clustering by country. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
where ∆lnXOPR n,i,t is the log-change in deflated operating costs for firm i in country n in year t, ∆lnSALE n,i,t is the log-change in deflated sales, GDPGROWTH n,t is the real GDP growth rate in country n in year t, AINT n,i,t is asset intensity (log ratio of assets to sales), LAW n is a binary variable equal to one for common-law countries, TUD n is trade union density in country n, BCC n is the bargaining centralization and coordination index for country n, BNFT n is the unemployment benefits index for country n, EPL n is the aggregate employment protection legislation index for country n, DEC n,i,t is a binary variable equal to one if deflated sales decreased in year t, and ε n,i,t is an error term. The sample selection criteria are described in Table 2 (Rogers 1993 ) with clustering by country. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
